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SANITARY BARRIERS AND INTERNATIONAL




One has a very hard time persuading a vet that animal
disease is not an important phenomenon of veterinary sci-
ence that also has financial implications, but is fundamen-
tally an economic problem that has some veterinary sci-
ence aspects.1
Until recently, in North America livestock disease issues benefitted
from a low profile. This low profile had continued over a considerable
period. As a result, public veterinary services were able to go about their
business with little public scrutiny and received little attention from politi-
cians. Their work was perceived as being in the purview of scientific ex-
perts and best handled by knowledgeable professionals. Of course, the
low profile was largely the result of the past successes of the public veteri-
nary services in eliminating or effectively controlling a range of animal
diseases in their respective domestic markets. If North America had been
isolated as effectively from the international media as it had been from
____________________
1  McInerney (1996), p. 301.27 Kerr
livestock diseases, probably little would have changed. Events that unfold
in far off places, however, are now instantaneously on the evening news
and the general public needs to be reassured that what they are witnessing
on television cannot happen close to home.
There is little doubt that the revolution in electronic communica-
tion has altered the environment within which public veterinary services in
North America operate. The stark and disturbing images of the burning
carcasses of animals slaughtered in the fight to control foot and mouth
disease in the United Kingdom in 2001 put the topic of animal disease
control into the living rooms of millions of (urban) North Americans,
whether American, Mexican or Canadian. When the last widespread out-
break of foot and mouth disease in a major developed country took place,
it was reported on less emotionally charged newspaper pages as a problem
of interest only to the farming community. The internet provides instanta-
neous information on almost any topic, including animal diseases, for any-
one sufficiently concerned by the images presented on their televisions
who wish to know  more. Of course, the internet provides no check on the
validity of the information presented and is open to misinformation pro-
vided by those with particular agendas. Public veterinary services and of-
ficials responsible for food safety have had to become much more proac-
tive in their provision of information and in debunking misinformation.
There are, however, a large number of other issues that have raised
the profile of animal diseases and food safety among members of civil
society. The world is becoming globalized not only because of the revolu-
tion in electronic information, but also due to the increased movement of
people and commodities arising from improvements in transportation. The
large scale transatlantic movement of individuals raised worries about the
ability of people to act as a vector for foot and mouth disease. Of course,
the problems that British authorities had in controlling the recent outbreak
of foot and mouth disease relative to past outbreaks arose because animals
are now moved much longer distances and more quickly. The distances
traveled are not solely the result of improvements in transport but also
reflect economies of scale in livestock slaughtering.28 Keeping the Borders Open
The appearance of a new livestock disease- -bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) with its apparent ability to affect human beings,
new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (vCJD), and a “made for media”
common name of mad cow disease- -has also done much to put animal
disease issues on the radar screen of many consumers. The difficulties
authorities in the United Kingdom had in dealing with the evolving infor-
mation concerning the possible linkages between BSE and vCJD, as well
as the widespread perception that the veterinary service was captured by
farming interests, had a profound effect on public confidence in the sys-
tems for animal disease control and food safety, in Britain and in the entire
European Union (Gaisford et al., 2001). The scrutiny with which animal
disease control administrations were subject to in the EU  in the wake of
BSE had some spillovers in North America. In addition, there were more
direct personal effects of BSE in North America such as the prohibition on
giving blood for individuals who had spent time in Britain- -again tending
to increase the profile of animal disease concerns. Further, the suggestion
that BSE may have resulted from feeding animal products to beef cattle
raised suspicions among urban consumers regarding the ethics of produc-
tion methods used in intensive livestock operations and tied animal man-
agement directly to food safety.
Of course, the other major change affecting the profile of the regu-
lation of animal industries has been rising concerns over food safety. As
the veterinary profession has a role in food safety inspections for meat
products and residual traces of drugs and hormones used to treat animals,
as concerns over the safety of food have risen, so has the level of scrutiny
to which regulators have been subjected.
The bottom line of all these changes is that animal diseases and
food safety have now become important issues on the political agenda,
particularly in Europe, but also in North America. Governments are re-
evaluating their animal disease and food safety systems and are attempting
to strengthen them so that confidence is maintained or enhanced.
Other forces have been at work that affect the regulatory adminis-
trations for animal disease control and the safety of products derived from29
animals. Improved transportation, refrigeration, packaging and cold chain
product management has meant that fresh (chilled) livestock products can
be delivered anywhere in the world at a competitive price- -the manifesta-
tion of globalization in the livestock industry (Kerr, 2001a). These changes
have meant that domestic protocols and procedures that previously had
only limited international impacts began increasingly to act as trade barri-
ers. Rising concern over the use of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regu-
lations as barriers to trade led to the negotiation of the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures administered by the
World Trade Organization (WTO) at the Uruguay Round of General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. One of the major changes
for the administration of animal diseases was the provision in the SPS Agree-
ment to allow for sub-national disease free zones. There were also provi-
sions in the Canada/U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA) pertaining to the re-
moval of border inspections (Hayes and Kerr, 1997). The stronger dispute
mechanisms embodied in the WTO have made it more difficult for coun-
tries to ignore their international trade obligations (Gaisford and Kerr, 2001).
The high profile WTO dispute over beef produced using hormones further
raised the profile of SPS issues in the international sphere (Roberts, 1998).
These changes in the international environment have also served
to increase the political profile of animal disease and food safety issues
because they raise questions of sovereignty. A further deepening of North
America economic integration will require a greater degree of cooperation
and harmonization among those charged with controlling animal diseases
and ensuring the safety of food products derived from animals (Hayes and
Kerr, 1997). The increasing political profile of animal disease and food
safety issues raises the issue of sovereignty and the relationship between
border measures and the cross-border management of animal diseases and
food safety.
THE TROUBLE WITH BORDERS
If we start from the perspective of an international trade economist
rather than that of a policy maker charged with the management of an
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animal disease or a threat to food safety, the use of border measures2 to
restrict trade suggests, first and foremost, opportunities to extend economi-
cally motivated protection to domestic vested interests. Opportunities to
provide economic protection can arise from the “illegitimate” imposition
of border measures or the abuse of border measures put in place for “le-
gitimate” reasons. It has long been recognized that sanitary regulations
justified on the basis of human or animal health can be used to provide
economic protection. While a policy maker charged with ensuring health
or safety may perceive border measures as one of the tools available to
accomplish their mission, trade economists see border measures as oppor-
tunities for protectionism. Allowing those who are charged with providing
health security or safety to make policy in isolation will likely mean that
the trade implications of their actions will be ignored. On the other hand,
those making trade policy need to understand how trade measures can be
used to bolster science-based animal health and food safety regimes. If
they do not, opportunities to better manage threats in these areas may be
lost in the pursuit of the benefits of trade. Of course, good public policy
making requires both objectives be taken into account when putting bor-
der measures in place. In general, the international regimes put in place to
regulate animal health and food safety represent reasonable compromises
between the two objectives. The policy environment is dynamic and the
rising profile of animal health and food safety issues over the last few
years, and the politicization of the issues that naturally followed, has meant
change. As a result, there has been some progress and some slippage in the
trade facets of the public policy regimes addressing these issues.
Figure 1 can be used to illustrate the problem of borders from the
perspective of a trade economist. The example illustrated in Figure 1 is the
more complex case of animal disease management although much of the
discussion could be applied to border measures put in place for food safety
reasons as well. To think about the question of animal disease manage-
ment from the perspective of an international trade economist, let us begin
____________________
2  The term “border measures” is used broadly in this paper and may include measures
that are not applied directly at the border, e.g. inspection of foreign slaughter plants or
requirements for veterinary certification that, while not applied at the border, hinder
the cross-border movement of livestock or meat products.31
with a world without borders- -or how the disease would be managed within
a single unified state.3 In this “no borders” case, the veterinary service
would manage the disease on the basis of the dynamics of the disease
within the animal population alone. For example, bans on the movements
of animals or animal products would be based on the requirements of sci-
entific management. Animals in areas of low risk would not be affected by
Figure 1: Animal Disease Management and Border Measures.
____________________
3  The assumption of a unified state is made to abstract from the administrative borders
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the policy and commerce would not be disrupted in those areas. While
there may be arguments among members of the veterinary profession re-
garding the degree of precaution necessary to ensure that a disease is man-
aged, commerce in animals and animal products will not be artificially
restricted.
In the science of animal disease control, international boundaries
are artificial constructs -- mere lines on a map that have no bearing on the
dynamics of a disease in an animal population. In a sense, either the lines
on the map are non-binding on the scientific management of the disease or
they represent an artificial constraint on scientific management.4 In either
case, they should have no bearing on the management of the disease. Bor-
ders, however, divide government responsibilities and controlling borders
is a central aspect of sovereignty. Sovereignty means that governments
guard the right to impose border measures closely, which does not mean
that they will not, at times, voluntarily agree to limit their control of bor-
ders by international agreement.  Relaxing sovereignty in this manner is
the essence of trade agreements such as the WTO and the NAFTA. How-
ever, what is voluntarily agreed to can be abrogated or re-negotiated. Even
in the European Union, where countries have agreed to eliminate border
measures, individual member states retain the ultimate right to leave the
EU and re-assert their sovereign right to control their borders.
Border measures are policy instruments used to eliminate, to re-
strict or to tax the movement of goods or services into (or out of) the
territory of the country imposing them. The imposition of any border mea-
sure has the potential to confer an economic benefit on some group in
society.5 In international trade, it has typically been domestic producers of
goods or services that compete with imports that benefit from protection
____________________
4  Of course, it may be that by chance the international boundary conforms to a natural
place to initiate disease management activities on the basis of good science. This case
is dealt with later.
5  Even export controls will help certain groups, e.g. domestic consumers of the product
who benefit from the lower price that reduced exports will bring. Of course, any change
in border restrictions will create both winners and losers—higher prices for producers
also mean higher prices for consumers.33
and, thus, have an incentive to ask for protection (Gaisford et al., 2001). In
international trade theory, the imposition of border measures is generally
seen as welfare decreasing.6 Government trade policy generally repre-
sents a balance between the desire for the benefits of  free trade and the
political necessity to extend protection, at times, to domestic vested inter-
ests. The ability of governments to capriciously impose trade barriers, how-
ever, significantly increases the risks for firms that wish to engage in inter-
national commerce. As a result, they will underinvest in those activities
and hence, the potential benefits of trade are not realized. This unrealized
potential represents the major externality of border measures and consid-
erably raises the costs of protectionism beyond the direct welfare trade-off
made in a market where the decision to extend protection has been made.
International trade agreements can be seen as attempts to reduce
the level of risk arising from the imposition of trade barriers by govern-
ments for firms that wish to engage in international commerce. Risk reduc-
tion is accomplished by mutually agreeing to limits on the ability of gov-
ernments to impose trade barriers and by making the circumstances under
which they can be imposed transparent to those that wish to make invest-
ments in international commercial activities. In other words, trade agree-
ments are designed to reduce the long-run negative externality associated
with the imposition of trade barriers. Trade agreements recognize the need,
at times, for countries to respond to domestic pressure for protection and
governments are always afforded an escape clause whereby they can im-
pose trade barriers if domestic political pressure is sufficiently great- -but
there may be cost associated with doing so.7 Hence, international trade
agreements represent a political compromise between the need of firms
that wish to engage in international commerce for strong rules pertaining
to the imposition of trade barriers by governments and the need of govern-
ments, at times, to extend protection to domestic vested interests (Kerr and
Perdikis, 1995).
____________________
6  Leaving aside academic arguments such as those pertaining to ‘optimum tariffs.”
7  For example in the WTO countries are always allowed to ignore their commitments
but the cost is that the Member Country injured by such an action is entitled to
compensation or has the right to retaliate by imposing trade barriers on the goods of
the offending country.
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Governments, having voluntarily agreed to limit their ability to
impose trade barriers (for example to eliminate all tariffs in NAFTA, and
more importantly, never to impose them again when faced with political
pressure from domestic vested interests looking for protection) will seek to
find ways to provide protection without incurring the cost. As govern-
ments have, over time, agreed to limit their use of traditional border mea-
sures such as tariffs and import quotas, they have increasingly turned to
non-tariff barriers to satisfy demands for protection. Non-tariff barriers
tend to be much less transparent than traditional border measures and more
complex because they often have a legitimate domestic policy goal as
their rationale- -they come as shades of grey rather than being black or
white. Border measures put in place for the purposes of animal disease
management and food safety concerns fall into this category and hence,
are viewed with suspicion by international trade economists.
Returning to Figure 1, once there is an animal disease problem in,
for example, a livestock or meat exporting country (meaning that borders
now exist in our model) opportunities are created to provide protection. In
the case of an animal disease, two possibilities exist - -border measures
can be imposed for illegitimate reasons or for legitimate reasons. Let us
deal with illegitimate border measures first. These are found on the right
side of Figure 1.
Illegitimate Use of Border Measures
Traditionally, the reason underlying the imposition of illegitimate
border measures is to provide economic benefit to domestic producers that
arises from protection from imports. The most obvious way to accomplish
a benefit is to impose a barrier on imports when there is no or minimal risk
such as a prohibition on imports into a country with a temperate climate
from a country with a tropical disease that cannot survive in a temperate
environment. The potential abuse of sanitary regulations has long been
recognized. According to the web site of the Office International des Epi-
zootics (OIE), the international organization that establishes the standards
for trade in animals and animal products:35
The ratification of the 1924 Agreement creating the OIE
reflects a desire clearly expressed by the Secretary Gen-
eral of the League of Nations that year. He invited various
governments to designate veterinary experts “to examine
the health guarantees that could be provided by cattle-ex-
porting countries, the facilities that importing countries
could accord on the basis of these guarantees and, in gen-
eral, to determine the most effective means of enabling statu-
tory veterinary measures to be applied, taking into account
the economic interests of exporting countries and without
prejudicing the interests of countries wishing to protect them-
selves against animal diseases.
The Economic Committee of the League of Nations thus, in 1924,
proposed to facilitate international trade in animals and animal products to
try to reverse the often highly overt tendency of numerous countries to use
sanitary arguments purely for the purpose of economic protection (em-
phasis added).8 It should be remembered that the early part of the 20th
century was a period prior to governments having encumbered themselves
with international trade agreements and, thus, the unilateral imposition of
tariffs and import quotas was easy. Even in this era, there was considerable
temptation to impose trade barriers in the name of sanitary concerns for
the sole purpose of providing economic benefit.
The second illegitimate reason for the imposition of border mea-
sures in relation to animal diseases is what can be termed “political precau-
tion.” It has come to the fore recently as a direct result of rising awareness
of these issues among civil society and the their subsequent politicization.9
Political precaution arises when politicians are being pressured to “do some-
thing, or to be seen to be doing something” in the face of strongly ex-
pressed concerns by members of civil society even when risks are very
____________________
8  Downloaded from  www.oie.int/eng/OIE/en_histoire.htm
9  This statement is not to suggest that political precaution is a new phenomenon, only
that it does not become an important reason for the imposition of trade barriers unless
an issue is politicized.
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low or largely speculative.10 A prominent example might be the EU ban
on the importation of beef produced using growth hormones where the
concerns relating to human health are speculative (Kerr and Hobbs, 2002).11
A similar argument might be made regarding the European Union’s evolv-
ing policy toward genetically modified organisms (Gaisford et al, 2001).
Politicians fearing an adverse voter reaction either from “inaction” on their
part or because voters do not have a sufficient “comfort level” with the
existing scientific consensus, are driven to imposing border measures even
in the absence of any group seeking economic protection.12
The restructuring of the U.S. food safety system in the 1990s was,
in part, motivated by political precaution. There was rising consumer con-
cern with food safety, a subsequent politicization of the food safety issue,
the government reacting to do something and the threat to impose border
measures on imports from NAFTA partners if their products did not con-
form to the new U.S. regulatory regime. The failure in the regulatory re-
gime in the United States was not perceived as a failure of science, but
rather a private sector failure in the meat industry (Spriggs and Isaac 2001).
____________________
10  Isaac (2002) provides the following taxonomy of risks: “Another important debate
associated with the Risk Analysis framework involves the type of risk targeted where
three types may be identified: recognizable risks, hypothetical risks and speculative
risks. . . . Recognizable risks can be identified through experience (data) and the
application of accepted analytical methods such as statistical inference and probabil-
ity theory, and they include a clear causal-consequence mechanism. Hypothetical
risks lack experience or data, but, with the help of assumptions and/or likelihood
functions they can be assessed within an accepted analytical method. Speculative
risks lack experience, data, a causal-consequence mechanism and an accepted analyti-
cal method for assessment. They are logical possibilities- -irrefutable, but untestable as
well.”
11  North Americans tend to perceive the beef hormone ban as purely “economic protec-
tion”. While the ban provides positive economic externalities for some EU interests,
the primary motivation appears to be “political precaution” (Gaisford and Kerr, 2001).
12  For example, there seems to be little pressure for economic protection from either the
biotechnology industry or agricultural producers in the European Union (Gaisford et
al., 2001). It is easy to see how civil society’s “comfort level” with the existing scien-
tific consensus on animal diseases can be reduced. From the perspective of a politician,
the reversal of the official “scientific” position on BSE represented a clear electoral
danger.37
Thus, it did not lead to a decline in the public’s “comfort level” with the
scientific consensus as was the case in the European Union. Removing the
threat of U.S. trade barriers, however, did impose considerable costs on
NAFTA partners. It has also meant that the U.S. system may now diverge
to some degree from the international approach to food safety (Spriggs
and Isaac, 2001). According to Spriggs and Isaac for the United States:
The major internal driver for change has been a series of
well publicized food contamination crises. These [crises]
have combined to rock consumer confidence in the safety
of the U.S. food supply, but more importantly, they have
led to a political motivation to restructure the food safety
system.13
They go on to discuss the Canadian situation:
With a significant reliance upon export markets, the Cana-
dian beef industry and the food safety system are well aware
of the structural changes occurring in important export
markets. These [changes] include both the legislated and
market regulations adopted as part of the foreign food sup-
ply chain. For instance, recent domestic crises in the United
States have motivated structural change in the U.S. food
safety system which, in turn, has altered the market access
rules for Canadian beef products. In order to ensure mar-
ket access and industry competitiveness, the Canadian food
safety system has had to restructure in a manner at least
equivalent to the restructured U.S. system.14
Politicized unilateral rule changes that affect market access are the antith-
esis of the surety sought in trade agreements such as NAFTA and the WTO.
The imposition of trade barriers for reasons of political precaution
affects exporters in exactly the same way as barriers put in place to pro-
____________________
13 Spriggs and Isaac 2001, p. 29.
14 Ibid., p. 56.
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vide economic benefits to domestic producers. If the ability to impose
trade barriers for reasons of political precaution is unconstrained, or not
transparent, then risks are created for exporters and investments in interna-
tional commercial activities are reduced.
Legitimate Use of Border Measures
While sanitary arguments can be used to justify the imposition of
illegitimate trade barriers, there are also legitimate reasons for a country to
put border measures in place. These are found on the left side of Figure 1.
The problem with the legitimate imposition of border measures from the
point of view of a trade economist is that they may be open to abuse to
provide economic protection either in their design or their application.
Borders divide administrative responsibilities. Public veterinary
services are constituted nationally. If for example, the professional veteri-
narians in an importing nation consider the veterinary service and/or its
co-requisite enforcement administration in an exporting country to be in-
competent, then the importing country has a legitimate reason to impose
border measures. Of course, the type of border measures that typically
restricts commercial flows of livestock or meat products may not be effec-
tive in controlling disease. For example, in the case of “blue tongue” the
vector may be wild ungulates that do not respect “official” border cross-
ings. The optimal animal strategy would have little to do with controlling
borders. In other cases, border measures, while sub-optimal from an ani-
mal management strategy, may provide the best line of defence when faced
with an incompetent foreign regulatory regime.
Even if the foreign veterinary service is competent, there still may
be a legitimate reason to impose border measures. If it is not possible to
co-operate with the foreign veterinary service, either because of other po-
litical concerns, e.g. Taiwan and China, or a clash of professional cultures
among the veterinary services, then border measures may be an appropri-
ate way to manage a threat. If for example, an agreement cannot be reached
on the exporter’s veterinary service issuing of export certificates, then bor-
der measures to require quarantine or testing upon import may be appro-
priate disease management measures.39
If there are differences on how to effectively manage a disease, i.e.
a scientific consensus does not exist, the national veterinary services in
different countries may not agree on the best management strategy to pro-
tect their domestic interests. There may be legitimate disagreements based
on the best available scientific information. In these circumstances, coun-
tries must have the legitimate right to protect their own interests by acting
in a precautionary fashion. This “incomplete information” rationale for the
imposition of trade barriers is well accepted and embodied in the SPS (Kerr,
1999).
Finally, border measures may be justified if the border, by coinci-
dence, is where a veterinary service would choose to impose a barrier to
movement for strictly animal management reasons. Probably the most ob-
vious examples are oceans or other large bodies of water. Water is unlikely
to be the barrier, however, along the arbitrarily drawn U.S./Canada or U.S./
Mexican border. The efficacy of a natural boundary should never be con-
fused with the administrative convenience of a national frontier. As na-
tional frontiers exist, they become administratively convenient places to
implement disease management strategies. The problem with seeing na-
tional borders as administratively convenient is that it ignores the eco-
nomic cost border measures imposes on exporters. Not “to see” national
frontiers can be a major challenge for those charged with managing ani-
mal diseases.
As suggested above, once the decision to impose regulatory barri-
ers is made, then those barriers are open to abuse both in their design and
in their implementation. Returning to Figure 1, there are a number of ways
that border measures may be used to provide protectionist economic ben-
efits in excess of those that would naturally arise from the imposition of
the barrier strictly for disease management purposes. The avenues for abuse
pertain to timing, geographic extent and the absence of regulatory harmo-
nization.
In one case, timing relates to when action is taken to impose bor-
der measures once an exporter has a disease problem where border mea-
sures are appropriate. For example, a decision to close the border to im-
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ports may be taken before the disease in the exporting country is con-
firmed. More open to abuse, however, may be the timing of re-opening the
border once a threat has passed. Veterinarians’ primary concern is prevent-
ing the disease outbreak or limiting its extent, not the facilitation of inter-
national trade. Thus, while they may not be open to “other” influences
when faced with a new threat, once the threat is passed, they have little
interest in whether the trade barrier remains in place. In fact, the decision
to re-open the border may lie with other officials subject to receiving a go
ahead from the veterinary service. Certainly, there is considerable suspi-
cion in Canada that this was the case in the recent closure of the U.S.
border to potatoes originating in the Canadian province of Prince Edward
Island. The rate at which countries receive the “all clear” in cases of foot
and mouth disease has also been contentious. The UK government feels
abused in this fashion by some other members of the European Union in
the case of BSE.15
The geographic area from which exports are banned, or into which
imports are restricted, can exceed those suggested by prudent animal dis-
ease management. Exports of products from an entire country may typi-
cally be banned even if the outbreak is localized and the veterinary service
of the exporting country has the problem contained. Imports into an entire
country may be restricted even when a disease cannot thrive in large areas
of the importing country. The absence of regulatory harmonization can
lead to abuse of border measures in aid of economic protection. This prob-
lem can manifest itself in a number of ways. For example, if testing proce-
dures are not harmonized, requiring specific tests prior to export may pro-
hibit exports if the tests are not available in the exporting country or may
raise costs if additional, but redundant, testing is required.
The certification of export facilities, the effort required in the certi-
fication process for live animals for export, the verification of certificates
and border inspections are all open to abuse (Hayes and Kerr, 1997; Kerr,
1988a; Kerr et al., 1986). Part of the problem with certification and related
barriers is that the rules cannot be sufficiently well defined to limit indi-
____________________
15 This may however, be a case of “political precaution.”41
vidual latitude. As a result, control of abuse may require removal of the
measure entirely.
If animal disease protocols are not harmonized, then countries may
be able to impose barriers to trade based on differing standards or proce-
dures. One recent example is the decision of Japan to ban imports of U.S.
poultry products in early 2002 in response to an outbreak of avian influ-
enza (AI) in Pennsylvania. According to Shane (2002):
Japan’s actions are contrary to standard practice, as the
strain of AI in Pennsylvania is deemed low pathogenicity.
Unlike other international authorities, veterinarians in Ja-
pan make no distinction between low and high pathoge-
nicity, despite the differences in the epidemiological and
consequences of infections with the different strains. Only
AI of high pathogenicity must be reported to the Office In-
ternational des Epizootics in Paris.
. . . There is, however, substantial evidence that low patho-
genicity strains of AI can mutate into highly pathogenic
forms, as seen in Pennsylvania in 1984 and 10 years later
in Mexico.
USAPEEC [United States of America Poultry and Egg Ex-
port Council] spokesman Jim Sumner said, “Japan has
clearly demonstrated its protectionist policies with this ac-
tion—and we must encourage our government to take all
steps necessary to see that Japan reconsiders its decision.” 16
While the taxonomy of opportunities for abuse of legitimate bor-
der measures presented in Figure 1 may not be comprehensive, a wide
range of protectionist opportunities are suggested. Non-tariff barriers to
trade are only restricted by the inventiveness of the bureaucrats charged
with devising them and hence, are difficult to anticipate once border mea-
sures have a legitimate raison d’Ltre.
____________________
16  Shane 2002, p. 1.
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LIMITING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MISUSE AND ABUSE OF
BORDER MEASURES
It is not possible to discuss control of the misuse and abuse of
border measures in NAFTA without referring to multilateral initiatives,
particularly the OIE because it has been recognized as the international
standards setting authority by the WTO; regional trade agreements such as
NAFTA are expected to conform to the WTO disciplines. Thus, NAFTA
may go further in a particular area than is required by its WTO commit-
ments but it cannot contradict them. It appears that in many areas affecting
trade in beef cattle and beef, the NAFTA partners have not been willing to
exceed the OIE/WTO norms. This unwillingness  suggests that there is
little commitment to deepening the NAFTA relationship contrary to what
was expected when the NAFTA was signed (Clement et al., 1999).
As suggested above, a primary rationale for the establishment of
the OIE was to prevent the illegitimate use of border measures put in place
under a sanitary justification. The method of control is simply requiring
that sanitary barriers have a scientific basis and that the country wishing to
impose the barrier has undertaken an analysis of the risks. The WTO dis-
pute panels have upheld these dual requirements in the North American/
European Union dispute over the import of beef produced using growth
hormones (Kerr and Hobbs, 2002). These types of trade barriers have not
been a major problem for trade in cattle and beef among NAFTA coun-
tries. Trade barriers imposed for reasons of political precaution have proved
much more difficult to control in international forums because the require-
ment for a scientific rationale and a demonstrable risk are trumped by
sovereignty arguments. According to Layard (1997):
Though the proponents of free trade often wish to minimize
regulation, this article will argue that the BSE crisis in par-
ticular, demonstrates that whether desirable or not, national
sovereignty is still vitally important to the United States
both legally and politically.17
____________________
17 Laynard 1997, p. 144.43
While there has been some evidence of political precaution in
NAFTA countries, as yet there has been no large scale playing of the sov-
ereignty card. However, there has been no major crisis in the area of ani-
mal health or food safety. As there are no international controls on  politi-
cal precaution, sovereignty is likely to be exercised in a time of crisis. In
theory, the European Union has much stronger controls on the exercise of
sovereignty than has yet been envisioned in NAFTA, yet sovereignty was
snatched back quickly from the European Union Commission in both the
case of BSE and the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Britain in 2001.
This example suggests that it is important, particularly for Cana-
dian and Mexican veterinary and food safety administrations, that they be
diligent in preventing a crisis and in ensuring that confidence in the scien-
tific consensus remains high. Given the heightened political profile of food
safety and animal diseases, a crisis could lead to measures with serious
long-term ramifications for beef exports.
Internationally, political precaution is at the heart of the debate
between the European Union on one side and the United States and Canada
among others on the other side, over the inclusion of the “precautionary
principle” in international trade agreements and multilateral environmen-
tal agreements. This principle, stripped of its pseudo-scientific rhetoric, is
nothing more than a retreat from decision making on the basis of scientific
principles so that political precaution is allowed to dominate decision making
(Isaac et al., 2002). While the recent experience in the EU can explain the
move away from science-based decision making, and it may be good poli-
tics, it is bad trade law. Allowing political factors to dominate the ability to
impose border measures for reasons of human and animal health opens
the system for capture by other (economic) interests and greatly increases
the risks for firms wishing to invest in international commercial activities.
Considerable progress in the control of abuse of legitimate border
measures has been made in recent years, but a great deal remains to be
done. The abuse of timing has as yet been little addressed. As suggested
above, the abuse of timing is asymmetric. While there may be cases where
trade barriers are imposed too quickly, it is unlikely that such “jumping the
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gun” is motivated by economic protectionism.18 On the other hand, deci-
sions regarding when to lift trade restriction imposed for human or animal
health reasons may well be influenced by economic protectionism. The
OIE puts no time limits on how fast a country must lift its trade restrictions
once the embargoed country has informed the IOE that its disease status
has returned to a state where trade no longer presents a risk. Ongoing
debates over the status of foot and mouth disease in some Latin American
regions may be an indication of timing abuse.
Over the last few years the greatest progress has been made in the
area of the “geographic extent” of protection, that is allowing for sub-
national zones to be cleared to engage in international trade, instead of
having to wait until an entire country receives a clean bill of health. This
step was a significant breakthrough, important  particularly for large coun-
tries with considerable variations in their climatic regimes such as Canada,
the United States and Mexico. The move to allowing sub-national disease
free zones has, for example, already considerably liberalized U.S./Cana-
dian trade in feeder cattle. For example, A Record of Understanding be-
tween the Governments of Canada and the United States regarding the
Area of Agricultural Trade was signed in December 1998. That record
involved a number of provisions that directly affect livestock trade. The
most successful of these was the Restricted Feeder Import Program (RFIP)
which facilitates the export of U.S. feeder cattle into Canada. The Record
invited additional U.S. states to participate. Further, Canada initiated a re-
view of regulations governing the import of animals with a focus on
regionalization (i.e. allowing imports from some regions even though other
regions of the United States do not satisfy Canada’s health regulations for
imports). The Record also works toward addressing inconsistencies be-
tween U.S. state and federal brucellosis and tuberculosis requirements as
well as co-operating with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Based on
a scientific risk assessment, Canada modified its swine quarantine regula-
tions to allow swine for slaughter to be imported from states that are pseudo-
rabies free.
____________________
18 Of course, it may be a manifestation of “political precaution.”45
The RFIP -- originally the Northwest Feeder Project -- has been a
considerable success. It allows imports of feeder cattle from low risk areas
for blue tongue and anaplasmosis in the United States. It led to a rapid rise
in imports of feeder cattle into western Canada. This type of co-operation
ties the Canadian and U.S. markets closer together and gives U.S. cow/calf
producers a stake in an open border, and hopefully will make it more dif-
ficult for groups such as R-CALF (an upstart producer group behind the
1998 U.S. trade actions against Canada and Mexico) to obtain standing.
Lynn Cornwell, then the President-Elect of the National Cattlemen’s Beef
Association publically stated:
. . . I believe in trade. In fact the highest priced feeder
cattle my family has ever sold went last Friday to Alberta
feeders.19
This comment does far more to ensure an open border than any formal
agreement. Further, the major beef packers operating in western Canada
are U.S.-owned and will not want their cattle supplies jeopardized by Ca-
nadian retaliation- -even unofficial tightening of red tape- -for future con-
tingency protection harassment from U.S. producer groups. Moves to ex-
pand the RFIP are being made. Industry groups have been co-operating
with these initiatives. As Young (2000) suggests:
Recognition of the degree of interdependence between the U.S. and Cana-
dian industries may motivate formulation of an industry group to pursue
joint interests. These actions are likely to facilitate dispute avoidance.20
The process of regulatory harmonization is extremely slow both at
the OIE and at the Codex Alimentarius Committee (Codex), which handles
human health issues. Such a slow pace however, should not be unexpected
given the large number of countries involved and their different levels of
development and technical capacity. One of the reasons for having re-
gional trade agreement such as NAFTA is to escape the “large numbers”
bargaining problem so that progress can be more rapid (Yeung et al., 1999).
____________________
19 National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, August 29, 2000. Downloaded from
www.beef.org/newsroom/ncba/ncba00_0829a.htm.
20 Young 2002, p. 33.
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Unfortunately, NAFTA lacks the necessary mechanisms to force progress.
There are no deadlines or closure mechanisms built into, for example, the
NAFTA Committee on SPS measures. As a result, it can be a place simply
to talk and raise issues rather than to resolve them. A reading of the recent
minutes of the NAFTA Committee suggests that some progress is slowly
being made but that a great deal of inertia exists. Given that non-trade
ministries have little interest in concepts such as “deepening economic
integration,” they give them only a low priority which means there are
large transaction costs like “fulfilment costs” that are faced by private sec-
tor interests that wish to move the agenda forward (Hayes and Kerr, 1997).
As a result, NAFTA looks very much like a “one-shot” deal rather than a
mechanism for promoting further economic integration among the mem-
ber countries (Kerr, 2001a).
In 1988, I wrote the following on the Canada/United States Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) and the livestock sector with its second stage ne-
gotiations (Kerr, 1988b,):
While the FTA will mean a considerable liberalization of
the trade in livestock and meat products, the agreement
also leaves many important points for future negotiation.
In particular,  . . . the harmonization of technical standards
remains to be determined. The negotiations surrounding
those issues will require considerable forethought and de-
termination if effective trade liberalization is to be accom-
plished.21
These same comments apply in 2002 and still reflect the NAFTA reality.
The “Second Stage Negotiations” continue.
One other aspect of NAFTA needs to be discussed- -the dispute
settlement mechanism. NAFTA countries have the choice of selecting ei-
ther the NAFTA dispute mechanism or that of the WTO. The NAFTA dis-
pute mechanism has a number of aspects that may favour the United States.
____________________
21 Kerr 1988b, p. 902.47
As a result, Canada and Mexico are more likely to choose the WTO mecha-
nism in the case of a dispute over sanitary issues with the United States,
while the United States is more likely to choose the NAFTA mechanism
(Kerr, 2001b). This dichotomy suggests that there will be less reliance on
NAFTA in the future, both for negotiations on sanitary issues and for the
settlement of disputes.
CONCLUSIONS
While the original NAFTA negotiations did much to promote the
integration of the North American cattle and beef markets, further deepen-
ing of market integration remains illusive. While there have been no major
crises in the area of sanitary risks among the NAFTA partners from an
international trade perspective, market access is neither secure or predict-
able. Opportunities for putting what have been referred to in this paper as
illegitimate border measures in place remain and “legitimate” border mea-
sures are open to abuse. From a trade perspective, having border measures
available for use suggests the need for ongoing vigilance to prevent their
capture by non-sanitary- -economic- -interests.
One of the more worrying trends that has arisen from recent ani-
mal disease problems, primarily in the EU (BSE in particular), is that mem-
bers of civil society have rising concerns regarding animal and food re-
lated human health issues. As a result, issues that have largely been left in
the domain of veterinary and human health professionals are becoming
politicized. The consequence is that “political protection” issues may in-
creasingly define the trade agenda for livestock and meat products. This
new element of public decision making will increase the level of risk faced
by those who wish to invest in international commercial opportunities in
these products.
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